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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
EVALINE HARMON and
(\)XRAD HARMON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
OTTO RASMUSSEN, LeREE RASMlTNSEN, his wife; LEONARD M.
SPROUL, and AMERICAN FALLS
CANAL SECURITIES COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
9690

Brief of Defendants - Respond·ents

STATE:J1:ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiffs seek judgment subjecting defendant's land
to an irrigation ditch easement over and across it claiming 60 years user, and $400 in damages as cost of recon~tructing the ditch.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court. From a judgment
for the defendants plaintiffs appeal.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest at one time held
title to both tracts of land here involved, and at sometime
conveyed to defendant's predecessor in interest the
parcel which plaintiffs seek to make servient to their
land.
The main ditch used by the plaintiffs flows generally
west across and to the west side of 11th West Street
which is also the east, or front, boundary of a number of
house plots, one of which is defendant's. At a point approximately 50 feet south of the southeast corner of
defendant's lot, the ditch forks. From the fork its principal course is generally southwesterly until it reaches the
land of the plaintiffs which lies along the west or rear
boundary of the house plots referred to herein. (Ex D5)
From the fork the side ditch went north along the
front or east boundary of defendant's land to its northeast corner, and then coursed west about 335 feet to the
northeast corner of plaintiffs' land.
The water was diverted into this side ditch, which
is the contentious subject of this lawsuit, at least twice
per year, but not at all after culinary water was brought
along 11th West Street, (R41 LNS3-28), which was done
in about the year 1954 (R64 LNS26-:29) by defendant's
testimony.
The ditch area to the south of the diversion gate in
the side ditch was filled in by the plaintiffs prior to
July 1958 to the level indicated in Exhibit D3 (R45
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LXRS-30; R-HJ LNS1018; R70-72 LNS25-2) employing a
tractor for the purpose. (R61 LNS1-12)
The side ditch as it fronts the Rasmussen property
was filled in before April 4, 1960 (R26 LNS2-20). The
Rasmussen house was moved onto the Rasmussen lot over
this fill in the ditch in July 1960 (R77 LNS11-21; R76
LNS2-20)
The fill in this ditch in front of Rasmussen property
was deposited by government workers clearing Mill
Creek and changing the course of the Jordan River about
March 1960. (Rl06 LNS2-18)
The Rasmussens bought (by uniform real estate
contract) this lot Th:fay 23, 1960. (R90 LNS7-17 - Ex
D4) At the time of purchase, sections of the side ditch
were either levelled or had piles of dirt in it 12 to 15 feet
long and 4 feet above the surface of the ground (R71-72
LNS21-2) which Rasmussen levelled out. (R92 LNS14-19;
Rl16-117 LNS28-22)
The 1nean level of the west side of 11th West Street
is from 6 to 10 feet higher than the east boundary of
appellants' land which lies approximately 300 feet to the
west.

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR, OR IN
ANY EVENT REVERSIBLE ERROR, IN FAILING TO DECIDE ALL OF THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS
IF THE DECISION OF THE COURT EXPRESSLY OR IM3
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PLIEDLY DETERMINED SUFFJtCIENT MATERIAL ISSUES
UPON WHICH TO BASE JUDGMENT.

While it is incumbent on the court to make findings
on all material issues, it is not reversible error where the
failure to make such findings is not prejudicial. Hall v.
Sabey, 58 Utah 343, 198 P 1110; Baker v. Hatch, 70 Utah
1, 257 P 673; Prows v. Hawley, 72 Utah 4±4, 271 P 529;
West v. Standard Fuel Co., 81 Utah 300, 17 P(2d) 292;
Huber et al v. Newman 106, Utah 363; 145 P(2d) 780;
Gaddis lnv. Co. v. Morrison, 3 Utah (2d) 43, 277 P(2d)
805; Dtmcan v. Hernmelwright, 112 rtah 262, 186 P(2d)
965.

Hall v. Sabey, 58 Utah 343, 198 P 1110 declares:
"It has been determined by numerous decisions of this court that the failure to make findings upon immaterial issues, or issues which would
not affect the judgment of the court, is not ground
for reversal."

Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 112 Utah 262; 186 P(2d)
965 at Pg. 269 declares :
"Failure to make findings on material issues
is not prejudicial, if no findings, other than in
support of the judgment would have been permissible.''
"And, of course, failure to n1ake findings on
immaterial issues, or issues which would not affect the judgment of the court is not ground for
reversal."
"And findings should be limited to the ultimate facts. It is not necessary to make findings
on the subsidiary or evidentiary facts."
4
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Iiul>er et al v. Newman, 106 Utah 363; 145 P(2d)
780 declares :

'• Even though failure of the trial court to
make a negative finding that ... were error, it
would not be prejudicial error requiring reversal
since had such findings been made the judgment
would have been the same in any case."
Nor is it reversible error when findings may be implied from those expressly set forth. S.imper v. Brown,
7+ Utah 178, 186 P 529, citing lJfitchell v. Jensen, 29 Utah
;{~-(i, 81 P 165; Dillon Imp. Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Utah 1,
RR P 670; Ererett v. Jones, 32 Utah 489, 91 P 360.
FHm,per v. Brown, 74 Utah 178, 186 P 529 declares:

"The rule is well settled in this as in other
jurisdictions, that findings must respond to and
cover all of the material issues raised by the
pleadings, whether evidence respecting this was
or was not adduced; and, if there be no such expressed or implied findings the judgment has no
support.''
The issues for which appellants contend findings
are: 1) That plaintiffs are owners of the land described
in Paragraph 2 of their Second Amended Complaint. 2)
That plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest for
more than 60 years have openly, notoriously, adversely,
and continuously under claim of right used an irrigation
ditch acros:;; defendant's land.
If this first issue was found against appellants, they
would be out of court. If the issue was expressly found
5
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PLIEDLY DETERMINED SUFFICIENT MATERIAL ISSUES
UPON WHICH TO BASE JUDGMENT.

\Yhile it is incumbent on the court to make finrlings
on all material issues, it is not reversible error 'vhPrP the
failure to make such findings is not prejudicial. lloll r.
Sabey, 58 Utah 343, 198 P 1110; Baker v. l/atclt, 70 Utah
1, 257 P 673; Prows v. Hawley, 7:21Ttah 4:-l-..t-, :271 P ;):2!);
West v. Standard F1tel Co., 81 Utah 300, 17 P(2d) 292;
H1tber et al v. Newman 106, Utah 363; 145 P(2d) 780;
Gaddis Inv. Co. v. lJforrison, 3 Utah (2d) 43, 277 P(2d)
805; D11ncan v. Hemmelu:riqht, 11:2 l'tah :2():2, 1Sii P(:2d)
965.
Hall v. Sabey, 58 Utah 343, 198 P 1110 declares:

"It has been determined h)T numerous decisions of this court that the failure to make findings upon immaterial issues, or issues which would
not affect the judgment of the court, is not ground
for reversal."
Duncan v. llemmelwright, 112 Utah 262; 186 P(2d)
965 at Pg. 269 declares :

"Failure to make findings on material issues
is not prejudicial, if no findings, other than in
support of the judgment would have been permissible.''
"And, of course, failure to make findings on
immaterial issues, or issues which would not affect the judgment of the court is not ground for
reversal."
"And findings should be limited to the ultimate facts. It is not necessary to make findings
on the subsidiary or evidentiary facts."
4
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I-IulJer et al v. Newman, 106 Utah 363; 145 P(2d)
780 declares :
"Even though failure of the trial court to
make a negative finding that ... were error, it
would not be prejudicial error requiring reversal
since had such findings been made the judgment
would have been the same in any case."
Nor is it reversible error when findings may be implied from those expressly set forth. Simper v. Brown,
7-t Utah 178, 186 P 529, citing llfitchell v. Jensen, 29 Utah
346, 81 P 165; Dillon Imp. Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Utah 1,
88 P 670; Everett v. Jones, 32 Utah 489, 91 P 360.
S1"rnper v. Brown, 74 Utah 178, 186 P 529 declares:
"The rule is well settled in this as in other
jurisdictions, that findings must respond to and
cover all of the material issues raised by the
pleadings, whether evidence respecting this was
or was not adduced; and, if there be no such expressed or implied findings the judgment has no
support.''
The issues for which appellants contend findings
are: 1) That plaintiffs are owners of the land described
in Paragraph 2 of their Second Amended Complaint. 2)
That plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest for
more than 60 years have openly, notoriously, adversely,
and continuously under claim of right used an irrigation
ditch across defendant's land.
If this first issue was found against appellants, they
would be out of court. If the issue was expressly found
5
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for the1n, it would have no bearing on the outronw of thP
lawsuit: and, therefore, is not material. In fad, the i~~HP
was conceded by stipulation at the very outset of the
trial.
If the second issue could expressly be found in favor
of the appellants, even then it would not be determinative
of the ultimate issue of the lawsuit. If the issue was
found against the appellants, they would he out of court.
However, appellants have established no adverse
user for the minimum prescriptive period of 20. years
despite the fact that the burden of proof is upon them so
to do. There is no evidence in the record that there has
been a severance of the servient estate from the dominant
for that required period of time. Appellant's contention
of sixty years user is not alone a test for the reason, incontrovertibly established in the law, that in the hanc\3
of one owner the use of one part of his property for the
benefit of another part is an exercise of property right.
While in the trial court's finding of abandonment is the
implication that there had been an easement of user, it
is possible that the Court had evaded a specific finding
on this issue because the evidence had not completely
satisfied it that there had been such adverse user, but
found itself on firmer ground for its decision in its finding of abandonment.
The ultimate issue of this lawsuit was determined in
the one express finding of the court to the effect of
abandonment on the part of the appellants. In this finding it additionally implied ownership of the lands in6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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volved in appellants and respondents as appellants allege.
Respondent, therefore, submits that the findings are adequate either expressly or by implication to satisfy the
rules of court and to support the judgment.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING
EXHIBIT D3 IN EVIDENCE.

Comparison with the reclining figure of the man and
the application of judicial notice to the average height of
man indicates the extent of the ditch fill in at one point.
Testimony of the defendant's witness that part of this
fill was made by him employing a tractor for the purpose, and that the total amount of the fill indicated was
in place in 1957 establishes a time element as well. It is,
therefore, pertinent, material, and relevant to show that
the state of the ditch for the period from 1957 to and
through the time of the trial, including the time when
respondent examined as the prospective purchaser.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT
DEFENDANT RASMUSSEN DID NOT FILL IN THE DITCH.

Appellant's reliance on doctrine of ratification to
establish Rasmussen complicity is inapplicable under
testimony in subject case in that no testimony establishes
any relationship between Rasmussen and prior-acting
individuals.
7
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"'\Yith respect to the doctrine of ratification upon
which appellants insist, perusal of Jo11es 'l'. J/ u I ual
Creamery Compauy, 81 Ptah ~~3. 17 P(:2d) :2-1-D, ~;) ALR
908, discussing the 1natter of ratification estahli~hP~ the
need for an identity of interest and some pr<>l:'ent <>X i~t ing
relationship at the time of the arts for "·hich ratifier iH
to he held responsible. Nowhere in the record does it indicate respondents to be in any way related with the persons
responsible for filling the ditch; namely, the appellantH,
the United States Corps of Engineers, or other parties
unknown.
On page 231 of the .Jones case, 2 C.J. 467,
with approval as follows:

i~

stated

"ratification as it relates to the law of agency
may be defined as the express or implied adoption
and confirmation by one person of an act or contract performed or entered into in his behalf by
another who at the time assumed to act as his
agent in doing the act or making the contract,
without authority to do so. The substance of a
ratification is confinnation after conduct; it confirms; it neither changes the contract nor makes
a new one with different terms."
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT JUSTIFIABLY FOUND THAT
PLAINTIFFS HAD ABANDONED THE SIDE DITCH.

Conrad Hannon, one of the plaintiffs, testified that
the side ditch had not been used since the yPar culinary
water had been brought along 11th vVest Street. His nephew, Dean Hannon, testified for plaintiffs stating that
~
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culinary water was brought along 11th \Vest Street in
1~l:l-1- or 1955. Defendant's witness, Nick Coons, testified
that he has not seen the so-called side ditch used in the
6 years that he has lived neighbor to the defendant Rasmussen's property. Ruth Beynon, witness for the defendant, testified that she had not seen the side ditch used
in the 11 years she has lived neighbor to the defendant
Rasmussen's property. Dean Harmon further testified
that he had used a tractor to fill an area of the ditch
indicated by Exhibit D3 prior to 1958. Testimony further
indicates that the west side of 11th West Street is substantially higher than the east edge of the Harmon
property which lies some 325 feet to the west which
indicates that there is sufficient flow and sufficient drop
to carry water to any part of the Harmon properties
should they desire to do so by ditching from the point
where the main ditch enters the llarmon property.
All the facts together with the court's taking judicial
notice of the critical need for irrigation waters in this
area lead only to one conclusion. The intent of the Harmons, coupled with the acts in filling the ditch and the
nonuser for any of the periods herein mentioned constitutes abandonment. (R107 LNS2-30; R117 LNS23-28)
17 A Am J ur 775-6 exhaustively discusses the subject
of abandonment in Section 170 as follows:
"An easement created by grant or deed may be
extinguished by abandonment. It may be abandoned in whole or in part and either by unequivocal acts showing a clear intention to abandon and
terminate the right or by acts in pais without deed
9
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or other writing. The acts claimed to constitntP
the abandon1nent mn:-;t slHn\· a destruction of the
easement, impossibility of its legitimate nsr resulting from smne act of the ens<>ment owner, or
other unequivocal conduct revealing tlH' intention
permanently to abandon and surrender the easPnlent. The question of abandonment of an easement ordinarily is one of fact for the jury.
''The intention to abandon is the material question
and may be proved by an infinite variety of arts.
It is a question of fact to be ascertained from all
the circumstances of the casP, and the moment the
intention to abandon and the relinquislunent of
possession unite, the abandonment is complete ...
"Time is not an essential element of abandonment,
and is not necessarily an important consideration
in determining whether an easement has been
lost by abandonment. A cessation of use for a
term less than the prescriptive period, accompanied by acts clearly indicating an intent to
abandon the easement, will effect its extinguishment."

Brown v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 36 Utah 257, 102 P
740, 24 LRA NS 86; Dahnken v. Romney, 111 Utah 471;
184 P(2d) 211; Tuttle v. Sowadski, 41 Ftah 501; 126 P
959; People v. Ocean Shore R. Co., 32 Cal(2d) 406, 196
P(2d) 570, 6 ALR(2d) 1179; Powers 'V. Coos Bay Lumbf'r
Co., 200 Ore 329, 263 P(2d) 913.
Brown v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 36 Ftah 257,
102 P 740, 24 LRA NS 86 declares :
"The mere nonuser of an easement created by
deed, however long continued, is not of itself an
abandonment of it, but, at most, in connection with
other facts, may be evidence of intention to aban10
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don or of actual abandonment, but an easement
may nevertheless be lost or extinguished. The
law with regard to this subject is stated in 14
CYC 1192 in the following words:
"An easement may be extinguished by an act
of the owner of the easement which is incompatible
with the existence of the right claimed. If the
owner himself observes it in a manner inconsistent
with its further enjoyment, or permits the owner
of the servient estate to do so, the easement will
be considered abandoned."

T1Jttle v. Sowadski, 41 Utah 501; 126 P959 declares:
''That an easement may be abandoned is well
settled . . . It may, however, be abandoned, and
thus extinguished, and this may be found to have
taken place when the acts of the owner thereof
clearly show that such was his purpose. When an
easement is once abandoned, it is extinguished for
all time."

Powers v. Coos Bay Lumber Co., 200 Ore 329, 263
P(2d) 913 at 943 quotes Bitney v. Grim, 73 Ore 257, 144
P 490 as follows:
"Time is not an essential element of abandonment. The moment the intention to abandon and
the relinquishment of possession unite, the abandonment is complete."

POINT V.
DEFENDANT RASMUSSEN IS A PURCHASER IN
GOOD FAITH WITH A RIGHT TO RELY ON THE APPARENT ASPECTS OF THE PROPERTY HE PURCHASED.
11
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There was obviously no ditch to put him on not i<'<' of
a possible ditch easement OY<.'r and a<"ro~:..; hiH land.
Neither was there any public record of the <.>x i~t<'ncr of
this easement.
17 A Am Jur 761-2 in Section 156 discusses noti<'P of
an easement or apparent easements from the physieal
condition of property as follow8:

"It has often been said that in order to aff<'rt the
purchaser of a servient <'~tnt<.> the pa~PlliPnt if
unrecorded, must be one that i~ apparent as \\'PII
as necessary and continuous, or the marks of thr
servitude must be open and visible. Accordingly,
it is held that if the servitude cannot be discovered
by an inspection of the premises, the purchaser is
not charged with notice of its existence except in
so far as he may be charged with constructive
notice under the recording laws. On the other
hand, the proposition that a purchaser of real
estate is charged with notice of an easement where
the existence of the servitude is apparent upon
an ordinary inspection of the premises is sound
beyond question. Normally, since an easement
implied, upon the severance of a tract, from an
existing use is a physically obvious servitude, a
purchaser of the servient estate will be charged
with notice of the easement.
"In this connection, the fact that an easement is
an 'apparent easement' is of importance in
charging a purchaser of the servient estate with
notice of such easement, and' apparent easements'
have been defined in this resp<>ct as those which
may be discovered upon reasonable inspection. In
regard to charging with notice the transferee of
the servient estate, apparent easements are not
12
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only such as are visible or must necessarily be
seen, but such as may be seen or known on a careful inspection by a person ordinarily conversant
with the subject. Examples of apparent easements
include canals and ditches, ... and water rights."

Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Urschell, 159 Kan 674,
157 P(2d) 805; Blake v. Boye, 38 Colo 55, 88 P 470, 8
LRA NS 418; JJJ ontesa v. Gelmstedt, 70 N ev 418, 270 P
(2d) 668.
Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Urschell, 159 Kan
67-t-, 157 P(2d) 805 was an action to restrain defendant
from barring plaintiff's use of a staircase on defendant's
property and connected with plaintiff's building by a
door through the wall between the buildings.
Plaintiff was denied the relief. The court in its syllabus declaring:
''One who has acquired a right or interest in
real estate under an unrecorded contract may
assert and maintain his right and interest there
even as against one who has subsequently purchased that real estate from the record owner if
such subsequent purchaser had actual or implied
notice of the right and interest possessed by the
holder of the unrecorded instrument.
"Notice is implied when it consists of knowledge of facts so informing that a reasonably
cautious person would be prompted to inquire
further ... "

Blake v. Boyle, 38 Colo 55, 88 P 470, 8 LRA NS 418
involved a ditch across the land of a bona fide purchaser.
13
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The court declared at Pg. 471:
"There being no evidence of the existence of
a ditch across the land at the time the defendants
acquired their title thereto, the defendants being
without notice of the existence of a right of way
across the land, this being an action to quiet title,
we are of the opinion that plaintiffs failed ..."

CONCLUSION
Defendant-respondent is justifiably entitled to have
the decision and judgment of the trial court affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
BERNARD L. ROSE
Attorney for Respondent
53 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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